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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
With this appeal, we examine another chapter in the 
history of Route 476, known to those in the Philadelphia 
area, who for so many years awaited its opening, as the 
"Blue Route." In this qui tam action, Anthony J. Dunleavy 
(the "Relator") sues Delaware County on behalf of the 
United States to recover treble damages in the amount of 
$1,450,000, the return of over $16 million in Department of 
Housing and Urban Development funds made available to 
the County from 1992 to 1995, and various other costs, 
interest, and penalties associated with the County's alleged 
violations of the False Claims Act (the "FCA" or "Act"), 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. 
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The district court dismissed Dunleavy's Second Amended 
Complaint on the ground that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction because the action was based solely on 
information or allegations that had been publicly disclosed 
through various newspaper articles, a pre-trial 
memorandum prepared by Delaware County in previous 
unrelated litigation, several annual audits prepared by 
Delaware County and submitted to the federal government, 
and a 1992 Grantee Performance Report ("GPR") prepared 
by Delaware County and submitted to HUD. This appeal 
raises issues which require us to further define the 
circumstances under which a qui tam action will be deemed 
to be "based upon the public disclosures of allegations or 
transactions." We find that the district court relied upon 
assumptions which broadened the FCA's Public Disclosure 
Bar beyond its intended scope. Hence, we will reverse and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The following facts are taken from Dunleavy's Second 
Amended Complaint. For purposes of this motion to 
dismiss, they, in the main, may be taken as true.2 
 
The events challenged here occurred in 1976 while 
Dunleavy was working as a consultant to Delaware County. 
Dunleavy's role was to advise the County with respect to 
HUD's Community Planning and Development programs, 
HUD's Community Development Block Grant program 
("CDBG"), and other related federal government programs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We realize that where jurisdiction is at issue, the norm is not to accord 
the party whose burden it is to plead jurisdiction the presumption of 
truth as to facts pleaded that must be resolved in answering that 
question. See 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1350 (Supp. 1996). We are also cognizant that in certain 
situations in which our jurisdiction is at issue we may be entitled to look 
beyond the pleadings to satisfy ourselves as to the existence or non- 
existence of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan 
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Neither of these principles 
influences the outcome of this case because our review can be 
accomplished without relying on these disputed facts and without 
consideration of contested matters not appearing in the pleadings. 
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In 1976, the County acquired by way of condemnation a 
56.6 acre tract of land adjacent to the Smedley County Park 
in Nether Providence Township. The tract is known locally 
as the Penza Tract. To make this acquisition, the County 
appropriated approximately $1,839,500 in funds provided 
by HUD and $685,000 in its own funds. 
 
Despite the County's original plans to expand the park, 
on January 26, 1979, it sold a 26.3 acre portion of the 
Penza Tract to the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation ("PennDOT") for $1,988,550. PennDOT 
acquired the land for the planned construction of Route I- 
476. A short time later, in 1981, the County conveyed an 
additional 1.9 acre section of the Penza Tract to PennDOT 
for $103,950. Both sales were, however, contingent on 
pending environmental litigation being resolved in a way 
that would permit the Blue Route to be constructed 
through the region. For this reason, the County agreed to 
place the proceeds of the two Penza Tract sales in an 
escrow investment account. 
 
The completion of the Blue Route remained blocked by 
litigation for the next several years. In 1988, however, the 
County transferred yet another parcel of the Penza Tract to 
PennDOT at a cost of $1,000,000.3 The last litigation 
barrier to the construction of the Blue Route was resolved 
in 1991, when the remaining actions were settled. 
Construction began again and the Blue Route was opened 
a short time later. 
 
Dunleavy left the service of Delaware County in 1992 
when his consulting firm's contract was terminated. On 
November 18, 1994, Dunleavy initiated this qui tam action 
against Delaware County, the County Council, and certain 
current and former members of the Council and officers in 
the County. On March 7, 1995, Dunleavy filed a First 
Amended Complaint. Then on August 14, he filed a Second 
Amended Complaint without seeking leave of the Court or 
the other parties' consent. On September 15, Dunleavy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The County disputes the accuracy of this allegation, contending that 
this sale actually involved a different tract of land not subject to HUD 
oversight. This is a factual question for resolution on the merits. We 
need not address it here. 
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belatedly filed a Petition for Leave to Amend which, despite 
the procedural irregularity, was granted by the district 
court on November 8, 1995. 
 
This action remained under seal, as required by 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), until September 5, 1995. During that 
period the U.S. Attorney and HUD investigated the viability 
of Dunleavy's complaint.4 On August 10, 1995, at the 
conclusion of the investigation, the U.S. Attorney issued a 
Notice of Declination of Appearance, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(b)(4)(B), concluding that the matters raised in 
Dunleavy's complaint did not constitute fraud within the 
meaning of the False Claims Act. At the same time, the U.S. 
Attorney turned over control of the investigation to HUD to 
review the matter for compliance with CDBG guidelines. 
 
HUD pursued its own investigation of the Penza Tract 
fund in March and April of 1996 and issued a Limited 
Audit Review on April 29, 1996. As a result of the Audit, 
HUD made a demand on the County for the return of 
nearly $2 million in HUD funds. At some point the County 
and HUD began negotiations to determine the amount of 
the funds owing to HUD. After learning of the possibility of 
settlement, Dunleavy claimed rights to notice and a hearing 
under § 3730(c)(2)(B) of the FCA. He alsofiled numerous 
Freedom of Information Act requests on HUD and on the 
U.S. Attorney. 
 
Despite Dunleavy's protests against a settlement, HUD 
denied him the opportunity to intercede and participate in 
the negotiations. On September 11, 1996, HUD agreed to 
accept the County's settlement offer of $1,921,699. Under 
the terms of the settlement, the County was to remit a 
check to HUD, and HUD would then return the funds to 
the County's line-of-credit where the monies would be 
available for eligible and fundable activities. Dunleavy 
unsuccessfully petitioned the district court to stay the 
administrative action necessary for settlement.5 Dunleavy 
then unsuccessfully sought a stay from this Court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. An unknown party did leak information about the suit to the press in 
the interim. 
5. As of the date of the consummation of the settlement and of 
Dunleavy's application to the district court for a stay, Dunleavy's qui tam 
action had already been dismissed by the district court for want of 
jurisdiction. 
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Dunleavy's Second Amended Complaint alleges three 
counts of violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729(a)(1), (a)(2), & (a)(7), one count of common law 
fraud, one count of payment under mistake of fact, and one 
count of breach of contract. Dunleavy's theory is that 
Delaware County defrauded HUD by not reporting and 
returning proceeds from the sale of the Penza Tract. 
 
Specifically, Dunleavy contends that the HUD funds used 
to acquire the Penza Tract were subject to a contractual 
agreement between the County and the federal government. 
This agreement required the County to follow HUD rules 
and regulations which limit the permissible uses of the 
funds and impose certain reporting requirements on the 
County. Dunleavy reasons that, since the Penza Tract was 
originally acquired with HUD funds, the County was 
required to treat the monies as "program income" and to 
provide accounts of the transactions to HUD. Dunleavy 
further contends that, once it became apparent in 1991 
that the County would not reacquire the Penza Tract, the 
defendants should have known, or knew but recklessly 
disregarded, their obligation to report the receipt of the 
Penza Tract monies in Annual Audits and Grantee 
Performance Reports and to repay those moneys to HUD. 
 
On July 12, 1996, the district court dismissed Dunleavy's 
Second Amended Complaint, finding that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction. United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County 
of Delaware, No. 94-7000, 1996 WL 392545 (E.D. Pa. July 
12, 1996). The district court held that Dunleavy's action 
violated the jurisdictional bar of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), 
which divests the federal courts of jurisdiction over qui tam 
suits "based upon publicly disclosed allegations or 
transactions." The trial court found that certain newspaper 
articles, a pre-trial memorandum from unrelated litigation, 
and the County's annual audits and GPRs publicly 
disclosed, prior to the filing of Dunleavy's complaint, both 
the misrepresented and the actual facts necessary to 
complete the inference of fraud. The district court assumed 
that all these documents were acceptable sources of public 
disclosure under the Act. The court then concluded that 
Dunleavy had not qualified as an original source under the 
Act. 
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Dunleavy filed a timely notice of appeal. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the 
district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction is plenary. United States ex rel. Stinson, 
Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 




The False Claims Act has been with us in one form or 
another since the Civil War. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 
§ 4, 12 Stat. 698 (1863). The FCA sets out civil and criminal 
penalties for persons who knowingly submit false claims to 
the government. 
 
The novel aspect of the FCA is the mechanism Congress 
has chosen for its enforcement. A private person with 
knowledge of fraud against the government, acting as a de 
facto "attorney general," can instigate litigation on the 
government's behalf against the parties responsible. Such 
suits are known as qui tam actions.6 
 
The FCA contains a built in incentive for a private 
plaintiff, known as the "relator," to bring suit. Under the 
original statute, a prevailing relator could come away with 
up to one-half of the damages and forfeitures recovered and 
collected.7 S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275. Congress has 
shrewdly "offset inadequate law enforcement resources and 
encouraged `a rogue to catch a rogue' by inducing informers 
`to betray [their] conspirators.' " United States ex rel. Findley 
v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679 (D.C. Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. qui tam action takes its name from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro 
domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur" meaning "who sues 
on behalf of the King as well as for himself." Black's Law Dictionary 1251 
(6th ed. 1990). Qui tam actions have their origins in the Thirteenth 
century royal courts of England where they were employed as a form of 
legal fiction. Lightly regarded local courts had jurisdiction over private 
wrongs. But a recitation that the suit was in the King's interest could 
provide access to the royal courts. See John T. Boese, Civil False Claims 
and Qui Tam Actions 1-7 (1995). 
 
7. The most recent incarnation of the Act has reduced this percentage 
but it still remains substantial. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). 
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1997) (quoting Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 
(1863)). 
 
The Act requires a qui tam plaintiff, before proceeding 
with suit, to disclose to the government the information on 
which the claim is based. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). The 
government then has sixty days to investigate the matter 
and to decide whether to intervene. The government also 
has the option to step into the action at a later date. 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). In either case, the relator is not entitled 
to a recovery under the Act if the action is one which runs 
afoul of the jurisdictional bars contained in 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(e). 
 
For example, the public disclosure bar operates under 
this section to divest the plaintiffs of subject matter 
jurisdiction if: (1) there was a public disclosure; (2) of 
"allegations or transactions" of the fraud; (3) "in a criminal, 
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, 
administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, 
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media."; 
(4) that the relator's action was "based upon." If the relator 
fails the public disclosure bar, he or she can only establish 
subject matter jurisdiction if he or she is an "original 
source" of the information. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). 
 
A. Effect of HUD Settlement 
 
At oral argument, we questioned the parties about the 
viability of this suit after HUD's settlement with the County. 
Both the parties and this Court agree that, notwithstanding 
the settlement, Delaware County continues to have an 
interest in the outcome of this qui tam action because 
damages may be awarded which exceed the amount paid by 
Delaware County to HUD in settlement. 
 
There is no question that under certain circumstances it 
is appropriate for the federal government to proceed 
administratively against a FCA defendant. The Act expressly 
contemplates such a move: 
 
Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Government may 
elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy 
available to the Government, including any 
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administrative proceeding to determine a civil money 
penalty. If any such alternate remedy is pursued in 
another proceeding, the person initiating the action 
shall have the same rights in such proceeding as such 
person would have had if the action had continued 
under this section. 
 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5). What is not clear on the record 
before us is whether the U.S. Attorney and HUD intended 
the settlement with the County to extinguish the 
government's claims under the FCA or whether the 
settlement addressed a less serious transgression such as 
a misinterpretation by the County of its obligations under 
the CDBG program.8 
 
However, we need not decide whether the settlement 
terminated the government's rights against Delaware 
County under the Act, because Dunleavy's right to proceed 
with his qui tam action remains unimpaired. Subsection 
(c)(5) preserves a relator's right to a percentage of the 
recovery even when the government chooses to pursue its 
claim administratively. See United States ex rel. Green v. 
Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2550 (1996); United States ex rel. 
DeCarlo v. Kiewit/AFC Enterprises, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 1039, 
1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Because the government never 
exercised its rights to intervene, the settlement between 
HUD and Delaware County does not negate Dunleavy's 
ability, as the relator, to proceed independently with his qui 
tam action. 
 
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the 
False Claims Act's purpose is not limited to punishing the 
wrongs against the general public; the FCA alsofills a 
remedial capacity in redressing injury to the individual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In its Notice of Declination to Appear, the government stated its belief, 
formed after its investigation of the allegations contained in Dunleavy's 
complaint, that the County's actions did not amount to fraud within the 
meaning of the FCA. Additionally, it is not clear whether the 
investigation undertaken by the government even amounted to the type 
of alternate proceeding contemplated in § 3730(c)(5). HUD did no more 
than conduct an audit and make a demand upon Delaware County for 
payment, at which point the parties reached a settlement. 
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relator. See United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC Corp., 11 
F.3d 136, 137 (11th Cir. 1994). In Neher, the court 
described the reasons for treating a qui tam action as one 
addressed to the relator's injuries: 
 
First, a qui tam relator can suffer severe emotional 
strain due to the discovery of his unwilling involvement 
in fraudulent activity. Moreover, the actual or potential 
ramifications on a relator's employment can be 
substantial. As several courts have recognized, qui tam 
relators face the Hobson's choice of "keeping silent 
about the fraud, and suffering potential liability (and 
guilty consciences), or reporting the fraud and suffering 
repercussions, some as extreme as dismissal." Finally, 
the relator can suffer substantial financial burdens as 
a result of the time and expense involved in bringing a 
qui tam action. 
 
Id. at 138 (quoting United States ex rel. Robinson v. 
Northrop Corp., 824 F. Supp. 830, 835 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 
The legislative history of the 1986 Amendments to the Act 
is also instructive. The report accompanying the Senate 
version of the amendments, which Congress passed in lieu 
of those in the House bill, explains the Government's right 
to proceed administratively as an alternate remedy to an 
FCA action. See S. Rep. 99-345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5292. While the 
Government can compel dismissal or settlement of a qui 
tam action if it formally intervenes, 31 U.S.C.§ 3730(c), 
Congress believed that "if the Government declines to 
intervene in a qui tam action, it is estopped from pursuing 
the same action administratively or in a separate judicial 
action." Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5292. 
 
Since Dunleavy, if a proper relator, has an interest in 
pursuing his claim independently of the government, the 
government, which has elected not to intervene, cannot 
compromise Dunleavy's claim even if the government has 
settled its own claim. A viable case or controversy therefore 
continues to exist since Delaware County's potential 
exposure in Dunleavy's qui tam action may ultimately 
exceed that which it accepted in its settlement with HUD. 
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B. The Public Disclosure Bar 
 
The present language of the Public Disclosure Bar comes 
from Congress's extensive amendment of the False Claims 
Act in 1986. As recounted more fully in our opinion in 
United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, 
P.A. v. The Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1152-54 (3d 
Cir. 1991), the 1986 amendments were an attempt to 
correct what Congress perceived as a century old imbalance 
between the under-deterrence of the original Act, which 
permitted "parasitic" qui tam actions to be brought by 
individuals with no independent knowledge of fraud, and 
the over-deterrence of the 1943 amendments which denied 
jurisdiction over all qui tam actions "based on evidence or 
information the government had when the action was 
brought." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded). Given 
that the 1943 Act almost entirely prevented the successful 
prosecution of qui tam suits, it is apparent from the 
legislative history of the 1986 amendments that Congress 
was mindful of the need "to encourage persons with first- 
hand knowledge of fraudulent misconduct to report fraud." 
Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1154. Moreover, Congress sought to 
enhance the government's ability to detect fraud by gaining 
"the cooperation of individuals who are either close 
observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity." 
S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5269. 
 
The current version of the Public Disclosure Bar has 
generated a host of interpretive issues, some of which are 
implicated in this appeal. Among the questions generated 
are the following: 
 
(1) whether the alleged "public disclosure" contains 
allegations or transactions from one of the listed 
sources; (2) whether the alleged disclosure has been 
made "public" within the meaning of the False Claims 
Act; (3) whether the relator's complaint is "based upon" 
this "public disclosure"; and, if so, (4) whether the 
relator qualifies as an "original source" under section 
3730(e)(4)(B)." 
 
United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co. , 99 F.3d 1538, 
1544 (10th Cir. 1996). We are concerned with only the first 
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two of these four questions. Because we conclude that 
jurisdiction is present based on our finding that 
"allegations or transactions" of fraud were never contained 
in sources qualifying as "public disclosures" under the FCA, 
we need not proceed further. 
 
1. Are the Disclosures of "Allegations or Transactions"? 
 
We must first determine whether the County has 
identified any sources which publicly disclosed the alleged 
fraud or the underlying fraudulent transaction. The County 
points to four sources for the jurisdictional bar: (i) several 
newspaper articles discussing the acquisition of the Penza 
tract; (ii) a pre-trial memorandum filed with the court in 
prior unrelated litigation initiated by a community interest 
group to challenge the County's use of HUD funds; (iii) 
annual financial audits submitted to the federal 
government pursuant to the County's obligation under the 
Single Audit Act, 31 U.S.C. § 7502; and (iv) a 1992 Grantee 
Performance Report prepared by the County and submitted 
to HUD as required by § 104(e) of the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, 52 U.S.C. § 5304(e). 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that only the 
County's GPR, if considered a public disclosure, reveals 
information crucial to making an inference of fraud. 
 
In this regard, the crucial question arises from the 
statutory language, "based upon the public disclosure of 
allegations or transactions." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). We 
must consider whether the information disclosed 
constitutes "allegations or transactions." As another court 
has explained, "the Act bars suits based on publicly 
disclosed `allegations or transactions,' not information." 
Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 
It is clear that the FCA's reference to "allegations or 
transactions" is in the disjunctive, so that disclosures 
which reveal either the allegations of fraud or the elements 
of the underlying fraudulent transaction are sufficient to 
invoke the jurisdictional bar. Findley, 105 F.3d at 686-87; 
United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 
F.2d 548, 552 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Hagood v. 
Sonoma Water County Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1473 (9th 
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Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 175 (1996) ("the jurisdictional 
bar may be raised by public disclosure unaccompanied by 
an explicit allegation of fraud"). 
 
The District of Columbia Circuit has devised a useful 
formula for determining the quantum of information that 
must be disclosed before the jurisdictional bar comes into 
play: 
 
[I]f X + Y = Z, Z represents the allegation of fraud and 
X and Y represent its essential elements. In order to 
disclose the fraudulent transaction publicly, the 
combination of X and Y must be revealed, from which 
readers or listeners may infer Z, i.e., the conclusion 
that fraud has been committed. 
 
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 
14 F.3d 645, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Springfield Terminal 
court goes on to explain that the inference of fraud requires 
recognition of but two elements: "a misrepresented state of 
facts and a true state of facts." Id. at 655. Injected into the 
above formula the variables take on the following labels: "X 
(misrepresented state of facts) + Y (true state of facts) = Z 
(fraud)." Findley, 105 F.3d at 687. 
 
It is not seriously contended that the Z variable has been 
disclosed here. The record is devoid of any public 
accusation of wrongdoing against the County before 
Dunleavy filed his qui tam action. HUD's audit of Delaware 
County's CDBG Program Penza Tract Fund did not begin 
until March 1996 and was itself a product of this suit. 
Therefore, unless we find disclosures in the record of both 
the X and Y variables, we have no reason for calling down 
the jurisdictional bar. 
 
In everyday language, a "transaction" generally involves 
"an exchange between two parties or things that 
reciprocally affect or influence one another." Springfield 
Terminal, 14 F.3d at 654 (citing Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 55 (1976)). What makes a 
particular transaction "fraudulent" within the meaning of 
the False Claims Act is less clear. We think it is sufficient, 
at least in considering the application of the disclosure bar, 
that the transaction merely be one in which a set of 
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misrepresented facts has been submitted to the government.9 
This we believe is consistent with the broader definitions of 
fraud employed in the False Claims Act. See Wang, 975 
F.2d at 1420 ("The Act's scienter requirement is something 
less than that set out in the common law"). 
 
In discussing the contents of his Second Amended 
Complaint, Dunleavy insists that 
 
his allegation of fraud was not Delaware County's mere 
failure to return the proceeds to HUD. By contrast, Mr. 
Dunleavy alleged that Delaware County only had the 
obligation to return the proceeds after the Blue Route 
opened. Mr. Dunleavy's allegation of fraud, therefore, is 
that after the Blue Route opened, Delaware County had 
an obligation to report or return the proceeds to the 
government but failed to do so. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 14. By this statement, we understand 
Dunleavy to contend that the crucial acts by the County 
necessary to the completion of this fraudulent transaction 
were its retention of the proceeds from the sale of the Penza 
Tract and its failure to inform HUD that it had these funds 
after the opening of the Blue Route ripened the obligation 
to return the money. 
 
We view the fraudulent scheme pled in Dunleavy's 
Second Amended Complaint as having four essential 
elements for purposes of our jurisdictional inquiry under 
the FCA's public disclosure bar: (1) the County was the 
recipient of funds belonging to the federal government; (2) 
the County had an obligation to repay those funds to the 
federal government; (3) the County failed to repay those 
funds to the federal government after the obligation became 
owing; and (4) the County failed to disclose to the federal 
government that funds belonging to it were in the County's 
possession. Elements one through three account for the 
"actual state of facts," while the fourth element corresponds 
to the "misrepresented state of facts." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. This broad statement assumes, of course, the relator's good faith 
attempt to make allegations conforming to claims specified in 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a). 
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The County identifies three newspaper articles which 
appeared in February 1980 and discussed Delaware 
County's purchase and sale of the Penza tract as well as its 
relationship with HUD.10 One of the articles stated "the 
county paid $1.8 million in federal Community 
Development funds for the [Penza Tract] property in 1976. 
. . . In January [1980] the county sold 26 - acres less than 
half the tract - to PennDOT for the Blue Route for $1.9 
million . . . ." App. at 90. Another article from the same 
year reported in greater detail on the possible uses for the 
sale proceeds: 
 
[Delaware County's Council Chairman, Charlie] Keeler 
said the original $1.8 million the county spent with 
Community Development funds would have to be spent 
on projects permitted under that program's 
regulations. Any additional property accrued in interest 
could be spent for other purposes, including improving 
the remaining park area. 
 
App. at 91 (emphasis added). A third article explained the 
transaction in which the Penza Tract was sold but 
contained no references to what would become of the sale's 
proceeds. App. at 92. The district court viewed all three 
articles as revealing essential facts about the purchase and 
sale of the Penza Tract as well as the use made by the 
County of CDBG funds and of the Penza Tract sale's 
proceeds. 
 
The district court also relied on a Pretrial Memorandum 
prepared on the County's behalf in an unrelated citizens' 
suit against the County. Dunleavy refers to this 
memorandum in his Second Amended Complaint. Second 
Amended Compl. at ¶ 24. In the memorandum, County 
officials represented that proceeds from the sale of the 
Penza Tract to the Commonwealth would "be returned to 
the Community Development program in accordance with 
HUD regulations." App. at 33. The district court viewed the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Although these newspaper articles are not mentioned in the 
pleadings, there is no reason why they may not be relied upon in 
determining whether we possess subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
newspaper articles were appended to the County's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion 
to Dismiss filed in the district court. 
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memorandum as a public disclosure of the County's 
knowledge of its obligation to return the funds to the 
federal fisc. 
 
A third source of information derives from Annual 
Financial Audits submitted by the County to the federal 
government in accordance with its obligations under the 
Single Audit Act, 31 U.S.C. § 7501 et seq. These audits 
each contained a Balance Sheet and Statement of 
Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balance for 
several accounts including one called the Penza Fund. The 
Penza Fund was described in the audits as a fund 
 
established to account for the proceeds and related 
investment income on the sale of a County owned tract 
of land to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the 
County's intention is to use these funds for the 
purchase of land. 
 
See, e.g., App. at 94. Despite the changes in the status of 
the accounts from 1985 to 1993, this description of the 
fund's purpose remained a constant. The district court 
found that these audits revealed the County's retention of 
the proceeds from the sale of the Penza Tract and the 
County's use of the interest from these proceeds. 
 
The final source identified by the parties and relied on by 
the district court is a 1992 GPR submitted by the County 
to the federal government. In this report, the County failed 
to account for the proceeds of the sale of the Penza Tract 
held in its accounts. The district court found that, by 
omitting the Penza Tract fund from the GPR, the County 
completed the disclosure of all material elements of the 
fraudulent transaction since this act "disclosed the 
County's alleged failure to report the proceeds to HUD as 
program income." Dunleavy, 1996 WL 392545, at *3. 
 
Dunleavy now contends that no combination of these 
documents could have revealed all the necessary elements 
to complete the inference of fraud. In particular, Dunleavy 
dismisses the GPR as "devoid of any information related to 
the Penza tract, the escrow fund, or the fraud scheme." 
Dunleavy insists that the GPR does not complete the 
disclosure of the fraudulent transaction because 
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[t]he 1992 GPR does not report any program income 
related to the sale of the Penza tract. It contains 
absolutely no information about the escrowed proceeds 
of the sale of a portion of the Penza tract, the obligation 
to return those proceeds or the use of those proceeds. 
It is absolutely silent as to any issue that is related the 
fraud scheme alleged by Mr. Dunleavy. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 22. 
 
The County concedes the accuracy of Dunleavy's reading 
of the GPR but argues the significance of this source 
derives from what the GPR does not say: 
 
[T]he only allegation which arguably was not disclosed 
was the actual non-reporting of the proceeds (and the 
interest thereon) as Program Income under the CDBG 
program. However, as shown herein, the County did 
report the receipt of the proceeds and interest through 
other public disclosures (i.e. the articles and audits). 
. . . [T]he fact of non-reporting was in the possession of 
the Government -- that is, in addition to being the 
recipient of most (if not all) of the public disclosures, 
the Government also received the annual Grantee 
Performance Report ("GPR") which allegedly omitted the 
proceeds as Program Income. . . . HUD was in 
possession of the public disclosures outlined above and 
was in possession of the GPRs allegedly omitting the 
Program Income . . . . 
 
Appellee's Br. at 27. The County maintains that it is the 
submission of the 1992 GPR to the federal government 
which completes the inference of fraud since it publicly 
exposed the inconsistencies in the County's other 
statements which acknowledged the County's retention and 
use of program income and interest, and the non-disclosure 
of that Program Income in the GPR itself. 
 
We conclude that the 1992 GPR is the only source that, 
if publicly disclosed, would complete the inference of fraud.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Here there is no evidence that, prior to Dunleavy's filing of his 
Complaint, the federal government had done anything more than place 
this information, along with countless other reams of paper, in some 
government file room. 
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As already stated, no source makes a public allegation of 
fraud. The remaining sources disclosed only the actual 
state of facts, i.e. the County's retention of the Penza Tract 
proceeds and interest. It is undisputed that only the 1992 
GPR contained the misrepresented state of facts, i.e., the 
County's failure to inform the federal government that it 
had these funds in its possession.12 
 
Although neither Dunleavy nor the County has produced 
the 1992 GPR as part of the record, they are in apparent 
agreement that Delaware County was obliged, but failed, to 
disclose its possession of the Penza Tract proceeds in the 
1992 GPR. Congress explicitly provided for the submission 
of such reports to be used in the Secretary's review of 
program implementation: 
 
Each grantee shall submit to the Secretary . . . a 
performance report and evaluation report concerning 
the use of funds made available under section 5306 of 
this title, together with an assessment by the grantee 
of the relationship of such use to the objectives 
identified in the grantee's statement [of objectives 
previously provided to the Secretary]. . . . The 
grantee's report shall indicate its programmatic 
accomplishments, the nature and reason for changes 
in the grantee's program objectives, indications of how 
the grantee would change its program as a result of its 
experiences, and an evaluation of the extent to which 
its funds were used for activities that benefited low- 
and moderate-income persons. The report shall include 
a summary of any comments received by the grantee 
from citizens in its jurisdiction respecting its program. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 5304(e) (1992) (emphasis added). Specifically, 
HUD regulations imposed a duty to record program income 
received or expended as part of the CDBG program. See 24 
C.F.R. § 570.504(a) (1993). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. To Dunleavy's way of thinking, disclosures that antedated the 
opening of the Blue Route are immaterial to our consideration of the 
public disclosure bar. We do not agree. While the inference of fraud may 
not have been complete until the County's 1992 GPR disclosed the 
misrepresented state of facts, the elements of the fraud disclosed prior 
to that point are relevant to such a fraudulent scheme and do not 
become immaterial because of the simple passage of time. 
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Without the benefit of Dunleavy's insider position, 
someone investigating government fraud would be able to 
ascertain that the County had not fulfilled its reporting 
obligation only if that individual had access to the GPR. 
 
2. Is the GPR a Public Disclosure? 
 
Our only remaining task then is to determine whether the 
County's 1992 GPR constitutes a "public disclosure" within 
the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A). Neither party focussed on 
this issue;13 instead, both litigants concentrate on 
identifying the elements of the alleged fraudulent 
transactions, under the apparent assumption that the GPR 
effected a public disclosure under the "potentially available" 
standard developed by this Court in Stinson, 944 F.2d at 
1157-60. Indeed, the district court shared this view of the 
GPRs in its simple conclusion that "[t]he omission of the 
Penza Fund from annual GPRs disclosed the County's 
alleged failure to report the proceeds to HUD as program 
income." Dunleavy, 1996 WL 392545, at *3. We believe, 
however, that this aspect of the case merits more attention 
than it has been given. 
 
To answer the question whether a certain fact has been 
"publicly disclosed," we must make two distinct inquiries. 
The first is to ask whether the source is one recognized by 
the Act. The second posits whether the extent of disclosure 
is sufficient to support the conclusion that the information 
contained therein is now public within the meaning of the 
Act. Stinson supports this division of our exploration. 944 
F.2d at 1154-60. In Stinson, we also undertook a two-part 
inquiry. We first examined whether the term "civil . . . 
hearing" as used in § 3730(e)(4)(A) encompassed documents 
produced by a litigant but not filed with the court as part 
of discovery proceedings during civil litigation. Id. at 1154- 
1157. Upon concluding that the statute did indeed 
contemplate this aspect of litigation as a source, we next 
determined to what extent the disclosure must be made 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Dunleavy does note in passing that "[t]he GPR's are not the types of 
disclosures enumerated by the statute, and must not be considered as 
public disclosures." Appellant's Br. at 16-17. 
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public before the jurisdictional bar is invoked. Id. at 1157- 
60. 
 
Similarly, we will first consider whether a GPR represents 
a source of disclosure contemplated by Congress in drafting 
the jurisdictional bar. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) identifies the 
following sources for disclosures: "a criminal, civil, or 
administrative hearing, . . . a congressional, administrative, 
or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation, or . . . the news media . . . ." The prevailing 
view is that this list constitutes an exhaustive rendition of 
the possible sources. We agree. As explained by the 
Eleventh Circuit, we may safely assume that Congress 
knew what it was doing when it crafted the FCA: 
 
The list of methods of "public disclosure" is specific 
and is not qualified by words that would indicate that 
they are only examples of the types of "public 
disclosure" to which the jurisdictional bar would apply. 
Congress could easily have used "such as" or "for 
example" to indicate that its list was not exhaustive. 
Because it did not, however, we will not give the 
statute a broader effect than that which appears in its 
plain language. 
 
United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 
1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1991); see also United States ex rel. 
Fine v. Advanced Sciences, Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1004 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that § 3730(e)(4)(A) "defines the sources 
of allegations and transactions which trigger the bar but 
. . . does not define the only means by which public 
disclosure can occur"); United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe 
Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Section 
3730(e)(4)(A) furnishes an exclusive list of the ways in 
which a public disclosure must occur for the jurisdictional 
bar to apply."); United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon 
Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (Section 
3730(e)(4)(A) "does not deny jurisdiction over actions based 
on disclosures other than those specified . . . ."). 
 
The only way to bring the GPR, prepared by the County, 
within the language of § 3730(e)(4)(A) is for the GPR to be 
considered an "administrative . . . report." It is unlikely that 
Congress intended the public disclosure bar to be invoked 
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without limitation as to the content or source of such 
administrative reports. Indeed, we conclude that Congress 
was not referring to administrative reports produced by 
non-federal government sources. 
 
As we determined in our review of the FCA in Stinson, we 
find that Congress gave us little specific guidance to 
determine the scope of public disclosure sources, including 
"administrative reports." It is noteworthy, however, that the 
terms "report, hearing, audit, or investigation" are modified 
by the words "congressional, administrative, or Government 
Accounting Office." The word "administrative" is capable of 
many meanings. Congress has provided no clear legislative 
intent or meaning for it in the FCA. We will, therefore, turn 
to the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, which permits us to 
treat this word as one which "gathers its meaning from the 
words around it." Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 
303, 307 (1961); In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 
282, 288 (3d Cir. 1991); 2A Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 47:16 (5th ed. 1992). The application of this 
doctrine is especially appropriate where, as here, "a word is 
capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of 
unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress." Jarecki, 367 
U.S. at 307. 
 
Our reliance upon this maxim leads to the conclusion 
that "administrative" when read with the word "report" 
refers only to those administrative reports that originate 
with the federal government. We take notice of the fact that 
Congress and the Government Accounting Office are 
entities of our federal government. We find it hard to believe 
that the drafters of this provision intended the word 
"administrative" to refer to both state and federal reports 
when it lies sandwiched between modifiers which are 
unquestionably federal in character. 
 
Moreover, a narrow reading of the phrase "administrative 
. . . report" does not risk the arbitrary results that 
motivated our decision in Stinson. There we expressed 
concern that the crabbed interpretation of the word 
"hearing" proposed by the relator might produce a situation 
where the jurisdictional question turned on whether a 
judge was present at a given deposition. Stinson, 944 F.2d 
at 1157. Here, in contrast, we have good reasons to treat 
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reports made by the federal government differently from 
those produced by state or local governments or by private 
individuals. Ordinarily, the party accused of defrauding the 
federal government is in control of most of the sources of 
information that would effectively reveal wrongdoing. This 
information dynamic was, in large part, a motivating factor 
behind the 1986 amendments. Congress emphasized its 
belief that "[d]etecting fraud is usually very difficult without 
the cooperation of individuals who are either close 
observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity." 
S. Rep. 99-345, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5269. Additionally, the Reporting Committee 
perceived the existence of "a conspiracy of silence" to 
defraud the federal government. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271. 
 
In these circumstances, the federal government is ill- 
equipped to protect itself by having certain information in 
its possession. When, as in this case, the defrauding party 
is a local government entity required to submit reports to 
the federal government, those reports have been compiled 
and produced by a party whose principal motivation 
(assuming the truth of the fraud claim) is the elimination of 
the paper trail of fraud. If state and local government 
reports were treated as administrative reports under the 
Act, the jurisdictional bar might be invoked through 
information submitted by those bent on convincing a 
federal agency that no fraud, in fact, was occurring. That 
problem is especially evident here where the County's GPR 
is the only source from which the public could have learned 
of the County's misrepresentations to the federal 
government. 
 
Moreover, a broad reading of "administrative reports" 
would be fundamentally inconsistent with the purpose and 
tenor of the 1986 amendments. Congress undertook the 
amending of the FCA to eliminate the draconian 
"government knowledge" standard applied since 1943. This 
standard barred all actions where it could be shown, no 
matter how attenuated the case, that the information on 
which the qui tam suit was based had passed into the 
possession of the federal government prior to the suit's 
filing. See S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-13, 
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reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275-78 (discussing 
inter alia United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 
1100 (7th Cir. 1984), where it was held that the state of 
Wisconsin could not maintain an action based entirely on 
that state's investigations of the defendant because the 
state had conveyed the same information to federal 
agencies in routine disclosures required by federal law). 
Concerned about the "conspiracy of silence" and the 
prevalence of fraud, Congress sought to reforge the balance 
between over- and under-deterrence. See S. Rep. No. 345, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5271. The principal intent of the 1986 amendments was to 
"have the qui tam suit provision operate somewhere 
between the almost unrestrained permissiveness 
represented by the Marcus decision and . . . the 
restrictiveness of the post-1943 cases, which precluded suit 
even by original sources." Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1154. 
 
The expansion of the FCA's definition of "administrative 
report" to state and local government reports would in effect 
return us to the unduly restrictive "government knowledge" 
standard. There is no suggestion that HUD had any access 
to information about the misrepresented state of facts 
beyond what the County submitted in its 1992 GPR. Nor is 
there evidence of any government investigation based on 
this information prior to the airing of Dunleavy's 
allegations. Although under the Stinson standard, this 
information is potentially accessible by any citizen willing to 
proceed under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 et seq., we cannot overlook the fact that Stinson dealt 
with information produced on the public record in 
connection with litigation while here we are concerned with 
reports that may be filed away without the receiving agency 
being put on notice that there is any reason to give them 
close attention.14 
 
For the above reasons, we conclude that Congress meant 
to bar reliance only on "administrative reports" originating 
with the federal government. Since the 1992 GPR was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We do not by this suggest that Stinson's "potential availability" 
standard never applies outside the context of litigation. We only posit the 
dangers of extending its reach to the context now before us. 
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prepared by or at the behest of Delaware County, it is not 
a source of public disclosure contemplated by Congress. 
Because we have answered the first part of our inquiry in 
this manner, we do not need to go on to the issue of the 




We reaffirm our holding in Stinson that "[s]ection 
3730(e)(4) applies only when information has been publicly 
disclosed through an enumerated method prior to the filing 
of a qui tam suit based on that information." 944 F.2d at 
1176. However, the facts of this case differ significantly 
from Stinson. We read 30 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)'s reference 
to "administrative reports" as barring only those actions 
based on administrative reports that originate with the 
federal government. Because the 1992 GPR is the only 
source which would reveal that Delaware County had not 
fulfilled its reporting obligation to HUD, we must conclude 
that not all essential elements of the fraud have been 
publicly disclosed. We will, therefore, reverse the decision of 
the district court and remand this matter to it for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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